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Problems with definition of
relational entities within spacetime
And a possible solution
Daniele Garancini
Abstract. The contemporary debate on definition of relational en-
tities existing within spacetime is mostly characterized by the belief
that amultiplicity of entities of such kind exists. The aimof this paper
is to show how this statement leads to some issues of diverse nature
and trying to propose instead a metaphysical position that might do
without it.
First I’ll show why we should consider the relevant entities as rela-
tional. Nevertheless I’ll show that my argumentation can also run
against entities primitively individuated by monadic properties.
Then, taking into account different theories, (stage theory andworm
theory in particular) I will show how special relativity bring to some
issues. Thepositions following those issues lead toproblems that are,
in my opinion, insurmountable for what concerns the causal rela-
tion. Moreover, even pretending we can solve those problems, there
is a counterexample to stage theory and worm theory in Minkowski
spacetime by cases in which symmetry between relational entities
force us to admitmultilocation in order not to loose the identity prin-
ciple of indiscernibles. Eventually I will analyse a counterexample
from quantum mechanics to the identity principle of indiscernible.
Given these distinct arguments, I will outline the borders of a meta-
physical monist position with the purpose of showing that it is a so-
lution to each, compatible with both the special relativity and with
quantum mechanics. This is a existence monism in which we talk
about several entities by selecting sections of the only existing object
with properties we choose. In this view there would be no need for
Identity Principle for Indiscernibles because it lacks any multiplicity
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of entities to define apart. Moreover it would be a determinist po-
sition without the need of any causal relation. In the same way in
which the right part of a don’t cause its left part we could say that the
temporal part t doesn’t cause the temporal part t1 of the universe.
Keywords. Relational Entities, Minkowski Spacetime, Proper Time,
Monism.
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Introduction
Onemay say that there are no reason to define concrete entities as relational as-
suming those as primitively individuated. In this position two H2O particles a
and b with all themonadic properties in commonwould be defined apart by the
fact that those are primitively individuated in different places. Now, given that
we don’t want this primitive property to be relational we would say that a is not
b because there is no cases in which they have all monadic properties in com-
mon they share everymonadic property except being located at xa which is only
a property of a . The problem with this position is that said properties wouldn’t
give any partition of the domain being referred exclusively to each entity which
guarantees the identity. It would be a theory totally in lack of explicative power
defining a apart from b in virtue of a property which apply exclusively to a and
to nothing else in the universe. It would be like saying that a is not b because a
is a , in fact the only reason why they’re defined apart is a property that can in
principle apply exclusively to a . Normally we look formore explicative position,
otherwise, let’s say: the personal identity problem could be solved saying that
Daniele stay identical to itself trough time because keeps having the primitive
property (the only relevant) of being Daniele which apply exclusively to it. Ba-
sically all the identity problems could be solved just applying this method and
defining each entity we want identical to itself on a primitive property which
apply exclusively to it. From now I’ll assume we don’t want such redundant po-
sition which, though being in safe from a multitude of objections would be not
explicative at all, not giving actually any account for definition of entities exist-
ing within spacetime. So I’ll assume we want relational properties as relevant
for the definition because we need to define apart twoH2Oparticles with all the
monadic properties in common.
I’ll consider the questions pertaining the persistence of relational entities
looking for a definition of entities possessing relational properties within space-
time. It doesn’t seem difficult to establish questions relating to the identity of
the entity with themselves when their relational properties change, to problems
related to the definition that we want to give them.
Distinguishing, as suggested by Sider, three-dimentionalism and four-
dimentionalism, we can say that, for three-dimentionalism, to ensure the iden-
tity of a over time it’s sufficient to ensure the identity of type. a at time t0 is
the same entity at time tn because it retains its kind while other properties have
changed. Unfortunately, if the only thing relevant for the definition of an entity
is its type, then all the entities of the same type are the same entity. Conversely,
if the relational properties are relevant to distinguish entities of the same type,
then we are introducing them in the definition of the entity and we’re falling
back into Stage Theory. About four-dimentionalism: Balashov, (2002) takes in
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exam two quadridimensional theories – Worm Theory and Stage Theory – with
the aim of showing that both agree with the results of special relativity. My pur-
pose is to demonstrate this conclusion as wrong because of problems with the
notion of proper time, and with multilocation. Moreover I’d like to jump in in a
debate between Calosi, (2015), Davidson, (2014) and Balashov, (2014) about ex-
trinsicity of four-dimentional shapes. Calosi’s position suggest that it is possible
to apply Lotentz’s invariance for the definition of existing relational properties
within spacetime. My aim is to show that both Stage theory and Worm theory
encounter problems in a position of this kind.
1 Stage Theory
Stage Theory, in order not to compromise itself with the idea that all entities
that share everymonadic properties are the same entity, must admit that the re-
lational properties of instantaneous entities are relevant for the definition. This
description seems to encounter some difficulties when it meets the description
of special relativity. Taking into account any a entity and defining time in terms
of relational properties, we will say that, in the S0 reference system, a is located
at temporal distance ∆t0 from any object b in S0, while from S1 the "same" a
is located in the time interval ∆t1 from the “same" object b observed from S1
(given Stage Theory, of course it becomes improper to say “the same object b”.
We should say "the object b2 treated as it were b1"). In the case of dilation of
times, we will have separate entities depending on the reference system from
which they are observed. To prevent this, we could exploit the special relativity’s
notion of spacetime distance.
InMinkowski spacetime, it is possible to determine spacetime-invariant dis-
tancesbetween twopoints according to theequation∆d2 = c2∆t 2−∆x2−∆y 2−∆z2
where t is themeasure of time in a frame of reference whatsoever, and x , y , z are
the spatial coordinates, in the same reference system.
So, having an invariant distance, we could define relational entities within
spacetime considering it as relevant for the definition of them. Then we could
say, in theaforementionedcase, that it canbedescribedby saying thatS0 integral
with a observes a2 (defined on proper time of a) in what t2 is for it (defined on
the proper time of S0) and that S1 in relative motion observes a5 (defined on the
proper time of a) in what t2 is for it (defined on the proper time of S2).
All distances between entities placed so would be defined in an invariant
manner, but unfortunately at the cost of introducing a quite complex notion
as that of proper time. It, defined as the time measured in a inertial reference
system integral with the phenomenon of which we measure duration, is based
on a naive idea of persistence of concrete entities in time. If we are to assume a
naive persistence of a in time to define its proper time and so each of the enti-
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ties {a1, a2 . . .an} ranging from t1 to tn proper for a (or S0), then we are using the
definiendum in definiens. Strictly speaking, moreover, in stage theory nothing
exists where common sense and physics see a .
So S0 in what for it is the time t2 observes a2 while S1 in what for it is the
time t2 observes a5 that S0 will see only when it will get to what for it is the time
t5. We can define the two a2 and a5 entities based on their spatiotemporal dis-
tances, invariant inMinkowski spacetime, via any asymmetric event. It remains
to be determined in what sense a5 is being measured by S0 in what for S0 is t5
whereas it is being mesured by S1 in what for S1 is t2. One might imagine that
there is no need to account for this but not doing so would make the introduc-
tion of spacetime distance useless. We opted for this option to give an account
of the phenomenon of times dilation; renouncing to do so would cast doubt on
the need to use spacetime distance as criteria to define the entities. Physics en-
counters no difficulties in introducing proper time and a trivial persistence of
entities. Unfortunately, philosophy is no easy game. Copying the description of
physics to solve problems is not enough. In the present case, doing so would
involve the use of the definiendum in the definiens, as shown above.
The whole notion of inertial frame of reference is based on the persistence
of concrete entities at the changing of their relational properties. Persistence
which of course is not simply given. Any time axis in Minkowski spacetime is
something’s proper time and is defined in these terms.
We could say that being integral with a is being integral with each of the in-
stantaneous entities which compose it. Having so defined a and its being in-
tegral to S0, we would overcome problems with its proper time. We define an
inertial reference system as a system where if a material point is free, meaning
not bending to forces or bending to null resultant of forces, then it will preserve
his state of rest or uniformmotion until it will be perturbed (to put it more sim-
ply: the first law of dynamics is valid). In other words, anymaterial point within
the reference systemmeasures no acceleration.
In both forms the notion of inertial reference system requires the presence
of entities at the variation of their properties. Instantaneous entities do not con-
form to this description: they, for their existing in∆t = 0, don’t preserve any state
of rest or uniformmotion. In ∆t = 0 no entity measures acceleration. Note that
∆t is something which is still possible to talk about in the new paradigm that we
have introduced. With ∆x2 = 0; ∆y 2 = 0; ∆z2 = 0 we have ∆d2 = c2∆t 2.
We could say that as some relational properties “change”, {a1, a2, a3 . . . an}
retain some others. Each element in the sequence of a integral with S0 keeps the
same distance from some k entity while their distance from some b entity in S1
keep changing. Obviously we cannot conceive a as a sequence of instantaneous
entities without doing the same with the rest. We shall define k as the sequence
of entities {k1, k2, k3 . . . kn} and b as the sequence of entities {b1, b2, b3 . . . bn}.
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We would say that a2 has the same distance from k2 which a1 had from k1 while
it has a different distance from b2 with respect to the distance that a1 had from
b1. Thus a2 is in S0 in the sense that it has the same distance from k2 that had a1
from k1 and is not inS1 in the sense that it doesn’t have the samedistance fromb2
that had a1 from b1. In Minkowski spacetime the set of points equidistant from
a given point is a hyperbola, not a circle. We’d be then compromising ourselves
with the idea that a can be integral to a frame of reference light years away from
his proper time, moving away. To avoid this we could add a clause for which
the only relevant distances for the definition of the reference systems are space-
like. This definition, which obviously can not make use of proper time notion,
requires that you can locate the next entity for any entity, then for each entity of
common sensewe haveℵ0 maximumentities. Otherwise it wouldn’t be possible
to identify from time to time the entity an towhich an+1must remain equidistant
to stay in the reference system . Wewould be in a theory that consider quantiza-
tion of spacetime in order to make possible applying the successor function to
entities, which accords well with the latest physical theories about the nature of
spacetime.
Unfortunately the position thus defined is susceptible of a counterexample:
imagine a planet that orbits around a star following a circular orbit of uniform
motion. Then, with a good approximation, the system can be defined as an in-
ertial system (i.e. centripetal acceleration can be ignored). So we will have three
objects: the planet g , the star q and a on the planet. At each time the distance
between any gn and an is the same distance that separated gn−1 and an−1 but also
the distance that separates gn from qn and an from qn would remain the same.
The vector spacelikewhich defines the distance between any g and correspond-
ing a and q in the mental experiment will always have the same value because
the planet describes a circle around the star. In the description just introduced
the only one available reference system would be a system in which the three
entities are not in relative motion, which is unacceptable. In fact there must be
also a frame in which a and g are moving with respect to q .
Theonlywayout seems to say that, looking at a fromdifferent framesof refer-
ence, various relational properties are observed and therefore different entities,
according to Stage theory assumptions. Where before we had an only a (instan-
taneous) we will have {a1, a2, a3 . . . } as many as the possible reference systems.
Then we will say that physics postulates an identity between an entity observed
in S0 and one observed in S1 but, strictly speaking, there is no identity.
2 Bundle theory and Theory of tropes
Bundle theory is the theory according to which entities are nothing over and
above the properties they instantiate. That is to say that where common sense
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sees an ordinary macroscopic object really there is only a bundle of properties.
Now: Bundle theory requires that relational properties appear in bundles. At-
tributing to bundles a position in spacetime that is relevant for their definition
is in fact essential to avoid, for example, that our world would be populated by
a single copy of each elementary particle of physics multilocated. We wouldn’t
say that the bundle a has the property of being at a certain distance from the
bundle b . Both because we would be treating bundles in terms of substances to
which properties can be attributed, and because talking about bundles within
the definition of a property would implicate difficulties, of which I will speak af-
terwards talking about tropes. Even admitting that in the bundle theory things
do exist as places does not solve the problem. "Being in the place xyz" can only
be defined in terms of specific distances between entities or between places.
We should therefore say that relational properties are copresentwith the oth-
ers in any bundle a . Considering again the two bundles a and b , we would say
that copresent to the monadic properties of a there will be the properties of be-
ing at a certain distance from each of the properties that compose b . This for-
mulation would enable us to define the relational properties satisfactorily; un-
fortunately, however, it leads to a infinite regress. In the bundle a the properties
of being at a certain distance from each of the properties that compose b will
appear. So also in the bundle b there will be the properties of being at a certain
distance from each of the properties that compose a . Then, if in a appears the
property to be "at 10m from the property of being b" in b will appear the prop-
erty of "being at 10m from the property to be 10m from the property of being
b". Note that I take here distance between properties as invariant distance be-
tween spacetime points at which those properties are instantiated. Of course
such an acceptation allows also to define distances between sets of collocated
properties.
Maybe it is possible to block the regress by claiming that in the bundle rela-
tional properties appear only with reference to non-relational properties. This,
however, involves two separate problems: i) The distinction between relational
properties and monadic ones may not have higher value than the explanatory
one. It is not entirely clear how to draw a clear line between these two sets or
if this is possible at all. ii) even if the distinction were perfectly clear, it would
still be unclear why relational properties should not appear with reference to
relational properties. This would seem to be an ad hoc solution to solve the re-
course.
Whether the bundle theory decides to accept this regress, whether it decides
to solve it by introducing a distinction betweenmonadic and relational proper-
ties and an ad hoc hypothesis, this position would appear as a version of Stage
Theory in the field of special relativity. In fact, the whole discussion regarding
the Stage theory problems with relativity could be transcribed here. Since the
RivistaItalianadiFilosofiaAnaliticaJunior
8:2
(2017)
32
Daniele Garancini Problems with relational entities in spacetime
bundle theory considers the bundle’s change (to which ontological value is not
attributed), at the changeof eachproperty that composes it, the conclusionswill
be the same, albeit with a drastically different metaphysical assumption.
Onemight think that the argumentused for thedefinitionofferedby thebun-
dle theory repeats itself unchanged for the theory of tropes. Such a theory in-
stead of reducing objects to bundles of universals take them to be bundles of
particulars i.e. the redness of a certain door is numerically distinct from the red-
ness, of the very same shade, of another door. Now: In order to define the re-
lational entities in spacetime as bundles of particulars, is required to define the
particulars involved. It seems necessary to clarify whether denoting by sign a a
trope, the sign b will denote the same trope or another. It is not clear how else
we might put the green of a and the green, exactly the same shade, of b as par-
ticular separate entities and not as universal ones. It seems therefore that it is
necessary to assign relational properties to the tropes, and in particular: i) de-
fine them as existing in spacetime or ii) as belonging to certain bundles. If the
tropes, like the particular entities we are accustomed to, are provided with re-
lational properties, the definitional problems related to the persistence of them
over timewould comeback again. If the tropes exist within spacetime, they have
relational properties and then we return to the typical difficulties of relational
entities in spacetime. Saying that they are defined as belonging to a bundle leads
to the sameproblembecausewewould be attributing to them relational proper-
ties with reference to other tropes. It would be enough the change of one of the
tropes in order to change all the tropes to which it is copresent. We might also
ask ourselves whether the properties assigned in such a way to tropes are uni-
versal immanent. To answer no and say instead that they are tropes themselves
means an infinite regress. Such a criticism seems to apply in an invariant man-
ner to any trope theorist who’swilling to define each trope apart fromeach other
accordingly to the principle of indiscernibility of identicals. According to such a
principle for two entities to be distinct they must differ in at least one property,
then what could two red tropes be distinct in if not in their spatial relations?
3 Worm theory
I will distinguish two possible positions: Type x) admits entities of a1 kind, en-
tities of the {a1, a2, a3 . . . an} kind (possibly extended to infinity) and entities of
the {a1, a2, a3, a6, a7, a8} kind. It then admits the set of all instantaneous entities
and the power set of it, without the empty set. Type y) admits the set of all stage
theory entities and the elements of the power set of it, without the empty set,
whose elements are connected, one by one, by the causal relation described by
Stage Theory (or by another equivalent). So we will have only entities of the a1
kind and entities of the {a1, a2, a3 . . . an} kind.
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The way in which physics explains the phenomenon of time dilation pro-
vides deliver concrete entities contraddicting Stage theorist’s assumptions. Now
we are in a different case: both possible positions admit the existence of entities
extended over time. Onewonders whether the existence of a extended in space-
time, whose identity is guaranteed by Lorentz’s invariance for each of its atomic
parts, would permit to consider its proper time. If it were like that, it would be-
come absolutely clear inwhat sense, in the examplementioned above, S0, which
measures the proper time of a , observes a5 in t5 and it would suffice any other
persistent entity to define the proper time for S1 and then say that S1 observes
a5 at its t2. Unfortunately this description includes two distinct problems:
i) As said, with the intent of according with the description of special rela-
tivity, I introduced the Lorentz invariance for the definition of the entities. It
applies from point to point by determining the length of a vector which estab-
lishes the distance between two points in Minkowski spacetime. The points in
question are called "events" and the philosophical description immediately no-
tices that these are instantaneous entities {a1, a2, a3 . . . }. The description of the
Worm theory and the relative definition of entities at the changing of their prop-
erties is therefore based on the notion of part for these instantaneous entities. It
defines each of them and then, by considering them as part of a single entity, it
defines the latter. So instantaneous entities {a1, a2, a3 . . . } are needed in order to
define a . In the aforementioned topic the persistence of a in time is used to de-
fine the notion of its own proper time to clarify the sequence of {a1, a2, a3 . . . } in
special relativity’s view but the persistence of a is given only by virtue of the suc-
cession of {a1, a2, a3 . . . }. We are again using the definiendum in the definiens.
ii) As seen before, the type y) requires the cause relation of stage theory or a
comparable relation to define entities that it wants existing without accepting
those it doesn’t want. Again, y) requires instantaneous entities and a relation
that binds them in order to define the persistent entities. So it compromises it-
self with all the difficulties of Stage Theory in the field of time dilation. Type x),
on the contrary, has no need for the causal relationship between instantaneous
entities todefine its entities because,more generously, it includesdiscontinuous
entities persisting in spacetime. The problem is that this very admission makes
it conflict with the naive idea of persistent entities of physics. It is not clear how
the proper time of an entity of the {a1, a2, a8, a9} kind can be defined. Perhaps it
would be possible using entities of the {a1, a2, a3 . . . a9} kind from type y) char-
acterizing them as such with a cause relation or an equivalent. This, however,
would involve all the problems related to this type of entity.
By generalizing, we could say that to define entities by Lorentz invariance
requires the notion of instantaneous entity and to define the succession of in-
stantaneous entities inMinkowski spacetime requires the notion of proper time.
The circularity of definition that I have brought to light above is not at all linked
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to the Stage theorist’s denial of persistent entities, but to the will to write down
physical description in the context of philosophical theories. Again, this does
not mean that worm theory cannot agree with the evidence of time dilation. As
in stage theory, in fact, we can say that, fromdistinct reference systems, it is pos-
sible to observe distinct instantaneous entities among which physics demands
a relation of identity by all means false. Similarly to stage theory, we then have
an infinite number of copresent entities independent from us.
4 Considerations
So for what common sense and physics call a in stage theory and worm theory
relativistic, there are more than infinite entities partially copresent that follow
one another overlap with distinct relational properties. Stage Theory does not
attribute ontological value to the metrological sum of the entities described as
such, while worm theory does. Now, it seems we’re bound to introduce some
kind of relation that provides a continuity between all those entities. Giving up
some kind of relation that provides said continuity would mean to give up any
talk in terms of past and future. It would mean to compromise ourselves with
the idea that two instants symmetric in time are be populated by the same ob-
jects. This conclusion is not necessarily junk: theories that assume a cyclic time
are plenty and they would probably accept that the idea that the world is pop-
ulated by the same entities each cycle. Even those theories, however, seem to
struggle in saying that there’s no such relation that guarantees what Sider calls
genidentity1. According to four-dimentionalism we perceive identity where it
isn’t between entities differentiated by their relational properties. In a theory in
which any continuity between the entities with relational properties isn’t pro-
vided, this perception of ours would be unmotivated. It would not be clear why
we attribute genidentity to a1 and a2 but we don’t consider them genidentical
to b1 having ideally the same monadic properties of a1. One could think the
reason is b1 shares all its temporal relations with a1, but this is not a solution:
precisely because a1 and b1 differ just for the spatial-relational properties it’s
not clear how common sense bestows with such certainty genidentity. We may
talk about proximity and say that two entities to be genidentical in time must
occupy very close regions of spacetime. This position, sadly enough, is sub-
ject to a counterexample both for spatial and temporal relations. We perceive
genidentity betweenentities distant in timeand space andwith teleportationwe
could soonfindourselves evenperceiving genidentity betweendistant spaces in
very short times. A theory that does not account for the great perceptive accord
about genidentity seems a stretch but in line with the principle nothing forbids
a stretch. On the other hand denying any relation which guarantees such conti-
1Sider, (1997)
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nuity we would also deny the possibility of any predictive assertions. Empirical
sciences would be then approximations of an experience which assumes conti-
nuity where it isn’t. This position seems to be countered by the fact that daily we
contemplate the success of our predictive capabilities, based on the pretended
continuity of reality. Usuallywemay say they are basedona continuitywhichwe
don’t comprehend completely, but here on the contrary we would be negating
any continuity and arguing that it’s not possible, in principle, to make any pre-
dictive assertions. I think that this position is unacceptable and so, from now,
I’ll assume that some kind of relation that provides continuity between four-
dimensional entities must be provided.
In Stage Theory it always was the cause relation that provided continuity. In
relativistic perspective, this could imply some difficulties. We can’t talk about a
set A1 of infinite entities in t1 and of a set A2 of infinite entities in t2, this would
need an absolute time. Taking into account any instantaneous entity a , it seems
difficult to link it with a relation to all entities that are relatively following and
that we’d want it to cause, for different reasons. i) we’re not legitimated to talk
about entities that are relatively following in absence of a relation that provides
continuity between the entities and said relation should be the very same cause
relationweare trying todefine. ii) it’s not clearwhya should cause {a1, a2, a3 . . . }
butnotb . We’re still talkingabout separate entitieswith relational and frequently
monadicdistinctproperties. Theonlyone thing thatbindsa witha1 andnotwith
b is a continuity we’re trying to guarantee precisely with cause relation.
ii) could be solved by saying that each entity causes all entities that are rel-
atively after that. To solve i) we could argue that either the cause relation that
allows us to guarantee past and future or some direction of temporal dimen-
sion are primitive. I’ll consider those position as equivalent and show that in the
description we’ve given there’s no clear relation between the entities we’re talk-
ing about. Let’s take three observers {s1, s2, s3} that observe each other. If every
frame of reference observes separate entities existing independently from the
fact that they are observed, then s1 will see {s11, s12, s13 }while s2 will see {s22, s21, s23 }
and s3 will see {s33, s31, s32 }. Therefore not only relational properties that connect
s11 with s21 and s31 aren’t clear, but also relations between s11 and, for instance, s22
aren’t. How could we say how distant is s11 from s22 ? Apparently no relational
property can be posed between such defined entities, included the causal rela-
tion.
Apparently we’re getting closer to a description in which each of the entities
observable from a frame of reference doesn’t have any relational properties with
entities observable from a different frame of reference. We’d be then in the sit-
uation in which to each frame of reference corresponds a universe, the entities
of which would be completely unrestrained from any relation with the entities
that populate the others. In fact it doesn’t seem possible to attribute any clear
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relation between the two entities a1 and a2 observed from separate frames of
reference. In principle this position, no matter how counterintuitive, remains
acceptable regarding only the relational properties of spatiotemporal distance.
However including also the cause relation, we create a problem: to solve point
ii) in fact, we admitted that each entity causes all entities that follow it. Now
we’re saying that each entity has relations only with the only entities observable
from the same frame of reference it can be observed from. Doing sowewouldn’t
have any cause relation between every stage theory entity, so even introducing
cause relation as primitive we wouldn’t account for the continuity. Even assum-
ing causation as primitive, it must be a relation only observed or hypothesized
which binds the entities in time guaranteeing a continuity between the entities
we observe from separate frames of reference. Otherwise we wouldn’t have any
continuity between the entities. But it doesn’t seem possible to attribute any
clear relation between entities observable from distinct frames of reference and
wehaveapropensity innegating any relation. Thatwould exclude cause relation
and with it the continuity, even as primitive.
Worm theory could think to be free from the need of defining cause relation
in order to have continuity between its entities only because it consider meta-
physically significant themereological sumof those entities. Actually this seems
to make the problemmore difficult, not easier. In fact, not only you have to es-
tablish continuity between a1 and a2 but also with the temporarily extended en-
tity {a1, a2}, each one existing independently from each other. Having a multi-
plicity of relational entities in its own spacetime it’s restrained by said reasons
from guaranteeing a continuity between them and this brings all the stage the-
ory issues.
Note that even in the case I discarded above of entities primitively individ-
uated by monadic properties this objection is available. In fact entities located
by primitivemonadic properties couldn’t be locatedwith respect to Lorentz’s in-
variance, which is a relational property. Onemay want to say that entities could
be individuated by monadic spacetemporal properties but the problems with
proper time don’t allows us to do so. In fact just like in stage theory we have a
newentity at the variationof relational properties. In this positionwehave anew
entity every time the primitivemonadic properties change. Thenwehave stages
just like in stage theory and the same problems with proper time (as shown for
worm theory it doesn’t matter if we admit or not the merelogical sum of those
entities). From this we would have different entities partially copresent for ev-
ery possible frame of reference. So the problems in guaranteeing any relation
between entities observed by different frames of reference then problems with
the causal relation.
Moreover, I’d like to say that even wondering we can solve the difficulty with
proper time, which we need in order to define relational entities on Lorentz in-
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variance, a problem will survive. Calosi and Varzi, (2014) solve with multiloca-
tion the counterexample fromBlack to the identity principle for indiscernibles2.
I will show that multilocation doesn’t agree with a position that assume Lorentz
invariance as relevant for the definition of his entities, creating problems with
the cause relation. Assuming we had defined somehow the notion of proper
time, which avoids us the issue of having independent entities for each frame of
reference. I’ll show that the position which assumes Lorentz invariance in order
to have amultiplicity of entities doesn’t accord with the principle indispensable
to allow for this multiplicity of entities. This because the principle can be saved
from the counterexample by Black solely thanks to multilocation.
Until now I considered causationwithout any specification because the only
purpose was to show that between the entities seen by different frame of ref-
erence in relativistic stage theory and worm theory there can’t be any relation.
So it didn’t matter what account we take for causation. Now I need a more pre-
cise formulation in order to runmy argument but I’m not going into the debate
about causation. For this reason I’ll consider two very general positions about
causation to which it should be add much more in order to have a good theory
but still are something that every definition of causation have to agree with. A
theory that somehow define proper time and consider relevant Lorentz invari-
ance should define cause relation either i) to be connected by a timelike vector
whose direction is primitive or ii) primitive which links one by one the events
in a sequence guaranteeing the timelike vector’s direction. Any position about
causation between relational entities existing within spacetimemust be at least
i) or ii), given that much more should be added for a good definition. In this
sense I’m considering causation as a relation which at least must be non sym-
metric and can go only from relatively past events to relatively future events. I
treat this in term of directionality of the vector that links the events. If, as I in-
tent to show, buyingmultilocation both i) and ii) implies causation in the wrong
direction (from relatively future event to relatively past events), then we have a
problem in general with causation.
Let’s takeBlack’smindexperimentwith a slight variation: imagine twoevents
a and b connected by a cause relation that goes from a to b and two events a1, b1
symmetric to them (therefore also a1, b1 will be connected by a cause relation).
To avoid that this kind of example disrupts the principle we must admit that a
and a1 are the same entity multilocated and that the same is true for b and b1.
So we have to admit that a causes b1 (and obviously a1 causes b).
Now: in ii) nothing forces that the vector that connects a andb1 to be timelike
or that the vector timelike that connects themhas the right direction. It wouldn’t
be enough to add a clause for the transitivity of cause relation. In fact it, this
would only lead to link a1 with an . It wouldn’t link, a1 with b forbidding the sym-
2Black, (1952)
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metry between events connected by timelike vectors.
In the case i) it would be impossible to have a symmetry in which a and b1
are connected by a timelike vector which has the wrong direction. This because
in any case in which a and b1 are connected by a timelike vector they’ll also be
connected by an asymmetric cause relation (in particular, placing a1 and b1 in
the past of a : a1 causes b1,a ,b whereas a causes only b). Interestingly nothing
forbids a symmetry in which they are connected by spacelike vectors.
Note that even a hypothetic case iii) in which maximum uncertainty is al-
lowed regarding cause relation, assuming it as a primitive only observablewhich
links events, would leave it vulnerable to this argument. Nothing forbids, in
this description, that cause relation between symmetric events connected by
timelike vector to be observed and this case described with multilocation cre-
ates problems with cause relation because it forces us to link with it events we
wouldn’t want to.
This leaves us only with case i). This description, completely incompatible
with special relativity, should be written assuming cause relation as “being con-
nected by any vector of primitive direction”. Basically each couple of events
whose invariant distance is composed by a ∆t , 0 would be causally related.
To this we must add that in said theory it’s possible for an event to cause itself,
due to consequences of multilocation. In this last position a counterexample
is still available: i) can run in different Minkowski spacetimes consider 1) infi-
niteMinkowski spacetimewith two spatial dimensions suppressed, 2) finite but
endless (that folds in on itself) Minkowski spacetime with two spatial dimen-
sions suppressed.
Imagine in 1) an infinite series of events with spatial coordinate a such that
each event would be preceded and followed by an event which has distance
t . Then, imagine a second series of events, each one with spatial coordinate
b such that each event has the same temporal coordinate of one of the events
of coordinate a . I’m going to show that, unless the identity principle of indis-
cernibles breaks, all this events are the same one, multilocated. Assuming for
simplicity’s sake a and b positive such that a > b , each of the events of spa-
tial coordinate a is caused by infinite events of coordinate a from which it has
distance {t ; 2t ; 3t ; 4t . . . } and causes infinite events from which it has distance
{t ; 2t ; 3t ; 4t . . . }. Furthermore, it’s caused by infinite events of coordinate b from
which it has square distance {t 2 − (a − b)2; (2t )2 − (a − b)2; (3t )2 − (a − b)2; (4t )2 −
(a − b)2 . . . } and causes infinite events that have coordinate b from which it has
square distance {t 2 − (a − b)2; (2t )2 − (a − b)2; (3t )2 − (a − b)2; (4t )2 − (a − b)2 . . . }.
Each of the events of spatial coordinate b is caused by infinite events fromwhich
it has distance {t ; 2t ; 3t ; 4t . . . } and causes infinite events from which it has dis-
tance {t ; 2t ; 3t ; 4t . . . }. Furthermore, it’s caused by infinite events from which it
has square distance {t 2− (a −b)2; (2t )2− (a −b)2; (3t )2− (a −b)2; (4t )2− (a −b)2 . . . }
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and causes infinite events fromwhich it has square distance {t 2− (a −b)2; (2t )2−
(a−b)2; (3t )2−(a−b)2; (4t )2−(a−b)2 . . . }. If, as shown, wehave to admit that each
of those events are the samemultilocated, then we are compromising ourselves
with cause relation that have the wrong direction. Taking into account three
of these events with separate temporal coordinates, we’ll have that the former
causes the other two and the one in the middle causes the most recent. Given
that these three events are the same onemultilocated, this implies that the latter
causes theone in themiddle and the former, andclearly the vector that describes
said relation has the wrong direction.
In 2) we have a quite different situation. We won’t have infinite events any-
more but a finite number of events with coordinate a or b such that each one
has distance t from the event that precedes and follows it. Again I’m going to
show that, unless the identity principle of indiscernibles breaks, all this events
are the same one, multilocated. Each event will have distance {t ; 2t ; 3t ; . . . ;nt }
from 2n events and have square distance {t 2 − (a −b)2; (2t )2 − (a −b)2; (3t )2 − (a −
b)2; . . . ; (nt )2−(a−b)2} from2n events. Considering any eventwe thenhave 4n+1
events from which it has a distance. This implies, given the position described
above, the same difficulties of case 1). If the cause relation is “being separated
by vectors of primitive direction”, each event it caused by 2n events and causes
2n events, and it implies, for symmetry, that they are all the same entity and so
we have unwanted cause relations.
Using the fact that its spacetime folds in on itself, case 2) could redefine cause
relation as ”being connected by a timelike vector that doesn’t necessarily have to
be the shortest possible”. Therefore, in the aforementionedcase, any event could
cause theevent thatprecedes it, in the sense that theyare separatedbyavectorof
primitive directionwith length (2n−1)t . In this description, the direction of time
would be saved but at a great loss. In a spacetime that folds in on itself, a relation
as the one introduced above, binds each event to itself and to all the other events
in spacetime. In this meaning the cause relation would be completely inert due
to the definition of the relational entities and so this theory would be exactly the
same as a theory which doesn’t make use of it. This would lead to issues relative
to the continuity needed between relational entities existing within spacetime.
So even imagining we have defined somehow the notion of proper time, is-
sues relative tomultilocation survive. Multilocation, on the other hand, is essen-
tial to avoid that the identity principle of indiscernibles crumbles to the coun-
terexample by Black. The principle is essential for every theorywhich assumes a
multiplicity of entities. Those issues, to my concern insurmountable, are based
on the assumption of multiplicity and because of those I suggest to give up this
assumption.
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5 Quantummechanics counterexample to the Iden-
tity Principle of Indiscernible
One may note that the argumentation above apply to philosophical theories
compatible with special relativity, which is not compatible with quantum me-
chanics so far. This way could be argued that all those arguments could be sim-
ply ignoredby theories compatiblewithquantummechanics, given that the very
nature of the two physical theories make impossible so far to have a ontolog-
ical position compatible with both. My goal is not only to show that a monist
position is compatible with both the theories but also to show that quantum
mechanics have even deeper problems with the assumption of a multiplicity of
relational entities.
Weadmit relational properties as relevant for thedefinitionof relational enti-
ties in order to define apart two entities with all themonadic properties in com-
mon. This becausewe assume the necessity of defining entities apart in order to
have a multiplicity in our ontology. If a counterexample is available to this, if it
is possible to have two entities with all the properties, even the relational ones,
in common, then we have a problemwith the identity principle of indiscernible
and so we wouldn’t be able to define entities apart. Let’s take two bosons a and
b , which, having integer spin are not subjected to the Pauli’s exclusion princi-
ple, so can be in the same orbital having the same spin. Say that a and b are at
a reasonable distance one from the other with at least a third asymmetric en-
tity which guarantee they have distinct relational properties. Now assume they
move with the same speed measured with the same precision, for the Heisen-
berg’s uncertainty principle we would have the same precision about the posi-
tion of both. Approaching a with b until they share the orbital we would have
two distinct entities with all the properties in common. Note that if we later di-
vide again the couple there is noway in principle to saywhich is a andwhich is b
(this last fundamental epistemic problem won’t be considered here). Note that
I’m considering bosons in the example because otherwise theMassimi, (2001)’s
answer to Margenau, (1950) would be valid. Moreover note that I’m not claim-
ing that bosons are necessarily indiscernible in every case. I accept Muller and
Seevinck, (2009)’s position aboutweak discernibility in the sense they prove it as
contingent. They admit case of indiscernibility for bosons which are precisely
the ones I use for the counterexample. My aim is not to show that bosons are
indiscernible in general but to show that they are at least in one case, which is
enough to break the identity principle of indiscernible.
In this case talk in term of multilocation as resolving the Black’s counterex-
ample is inappropriate. We’re not in front of one entity which occupies two
position, those are two entities which occupy the same position having all the
monadic properties in common. In quantummechanics the “cloud of probabil-
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ity” in which the particle is located is its position until something interact with
it provoking the collapse of the wave function. We shouldn’t consider the par-
ticle as having a specific trajectory we don’t know but as located, with different
probability in every point of the cloud. Then we can have entities which share
location but are still not identical, in fact in everymoment a and b could interact
provoking the collapse of the wave function. If the give bosons have a mass the
system would have mass double with respect to each boson, given this it seems
hard to deny that we have two entities that share all properties.
Onemay say that this counterexample couldbe solved treatingquantumme-
chanics in fictionalist terms. He would assert, in other words, that bosons exist
only as useful abstractionwe need in order to explain phenomena in themacro-
scopic world. Then the properties of such abstraction couldn’t be a counterex-
ample about concrete entities. I think in this case a strumentalist position is
not available. For sure at the beginning particles as bosons has been introduced
as a theoretical expedient but now we have different experiments which gave
empirical confirmation of the existence of such entities. ATLAS detector in the
LHC took billions pictures of elemental particles interaction. We are able to re-
duce the intensityof a laseruntil introducing in theMach-Zender interferometer
just one photon but it’s impossible in principle to introduce half photon. This
seems confirm the quantisation of energy specifically in a experiment that con-
firmwave-particle dualism. Of course from empirical confirmation don’t follow
existence but it exclude the possibility of posing those entities as mere abstrac-
tions. Who deny the existence of bosons have the burden of proof, those are in
the number of thing we should account in our ontological theories. The facts
that i) we cant have direct experience of those entities and ii) those entitles can
bemeasured only interactingwith something don’t seems particularly problem-
atic. A notion of concrete entities which accept only directly perceived entities
seems problematic by itself excluding because it excludes Neptune or viruses.
About ii) we have to consider that every kind of empirical confirmation is based
on interaction between entities, maybe quantummechanics particles are coun-
terintuitive but are given to our experience just like everything else.
Concluding if the counterexample is valid thena theory compatiblewithquan-
tummechanics can’t have that two entities sharing all the propertiesmust be the
same entity. But this is fundamental in order to define entities apart one to the
others, it’s fundamental, basically, for every theory assume a multiplicity of re-
lational entities.
Taking again into account a position in which no relational properties are
considered and the relevant entities are primitively individuated by monadic
properties would bring to the very same difficulty. In this case a and b would
still share all the properties, and the identity principle still brake, the only dif-
ference is that they don’t share anymore position as relational but as monadic
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property.
Conclusions
In light of those arguments I suggest to give up the assumption of multiplicity
and therefore support the idea that the object of our sensible experience is only
oneentity. Imeananexistencemonism inwhich theonly thing chargedwithon-
tological value is the whole and our talks about entities are considered as taking
into account section of the wale, sectioned by finite set of properties. Obviously,
any identity principle of indiscernibles wouldn’t be needed, having only one en-
tity loadedwith ontological value. The appearance of thingswouldmerely be an
arbitrary selection of parts of this only object, which allows us to solve both the
identity problem andmany other philosophically relevant issues. It could seem
that sections still need a principle of identity thanks towhichwe can distinguish
a section from another, but because sections don’t have any independent exis-
tence this necessity falls apart.
Saying “consider two sections a andb such that a has theproperties (or,more
properly: is selected by criteria) F and Q and b has the properties P and R” the
fact of having defined them as two section is everything we need to distinguish
them. Nothings forbids us to say “consider two sections such that each has the
properties F and Q” and the possibility to distinguish them (in principle, not
epistemologically) will be given by the fact that they have been sectioned apart
fromeach other. The fact that two section of the universe so described can share
all the properties which have been used to select them, wouldn’t be a difficulty.
Even a perspective that assumes that a single section could be discernible from
itself in given circumstances would be acceptable. In a slightly easier example
we’d say “consider a section a such that a has either the properties F andQ or P
and R” (more explicitly “consider at time t a section a which in time s0 has the
properties F andQ and in space s1 has the properties P and R”). In this position
no identity principle would be required without the needing of defining several
entities apart. The only entity can be sectioned in various ways up to extremely
counterintuitive sections. The choice of some theories among others would be
determined by criteria with which we normally choose a theory or another. Per-
spectives theoretically possible but extremely counterintuitivewill obviously re-
quire huge theoretical benefits to be accepted. Actually it could be the case of
quantum physics which admits distinct though indiscernible entities.
It’s suitable to highlight that in this theory sections are not made up by the
person that introduces the perspective. He’s free to define them in regards to
number and selection criteria but the continuum he experiences is, at least in
part, independent from him. This allows the possibility of having empirical ac-
knowledgement as it’s normally described from the moment when a point of
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view is set. Having a single concrete entity, what we normally consider as amul-
titude of entities could be described as an arbitrary selection and the properties
we considered till now relevant for the definition of entities would be now crite-
ria we’d use to select. Those wouldn’t have any existence independent from us.
We’d be free to describe the selections either as instantaneous or as having tem-
poral parts according to the selection criteria we’ll decide to use, also based on
the positionwe’ll assume about the question onwhether spacetime is quantized
or not.
Wewouldn’t end up in the problematicWormTheory case, in whichwe need
continuity between a1, a2 and also {a1; a2} because none of these things would
exist independently from us, but only as a section we “cut” for theoretical pur-
poses. Continuity would be guaranteed by the fact that we have only one en-
tity. More generally we’ll be free from the need of talking in terms of cause rela-
tion. In an universe considered as an object extended in four dimension, in the
same way the right part of a don’t cause its left part, its temporal part a1 doesn’t
cause a2. From this viewpoint we assist and we’re part of an entity extended in
spacetime each parts of which has properties. The genidentity we affirm and
the predictively of our laws is explained without using the notion of cause rela-
tion which becomes describable in fictionalist terms. Distance relation would
be merely relations between sectioned parts without any cause relation, which
we need in order to have continuity between a multiplicity of entities. This im-
plies the renounce of a strong conception of past and future. Past and future
would derive from the causal relation described from a fictionalist viewpoint in
order to explain that universe parts have atemporally the properties which time
by time we observe and predict.
The fact that from different frames of reference we observe different prop-
erties doesn’t seem problematic. In fact, because we are not observing entities
with ontological value this wouldn’t bring us to the sceptical hypothesis and so
we wouldn’t be committed with the proliferation of entities typical of ontology
with a multiplicity of entities.
This theory is not free of complications. Affirming that we don’t have any
causal relations but only temporal and spatial parts of a single entity we avoid
theaforementionedcomplicationsbutwe switch toa strictlydeterministic view-
point. Therewouldn’t be anyplace, from this viewpoint, for freewill, because ev-
ery part of the universe would’ve already been determined. The romantic idea
we have of free will, without it’s emotional content, could be described as de-
rived from cause relation defined in a fictionalist terms in order to account for
atemporality and aspatiality of the single object we observe. But we must con-
sider the evidence of radioactive isotopes decay, which according to quantum
physics is in principle unpredictable (without forgetting it’s possible to deter-
mine the chances for an atom to decay at any given moment, as it is possible to
RivistaItalianadiFilosofiaAnaliticaJunior
8:2
(2017)
44
Daniele Garancini Problems with relational entities in spacetime
determine its half-life) and this seems a counterexample to any possible deter-
ministic viewpoint.
I see at least twoways out from this problem: i) admitting the stochastic-only
predictability of some events, still necessary. Themonist position in fact, doesn’t
require the causal relation for its determinism. It’s given from the fact that the
universe is compounded by parts which have properties and it’s atemporal and
aspatial. It therefore assumes that each part has “already” the properties we did
observe, observe and will observe. So in a certain unpredictablemoment where
“there was” the section isotope c there will be the section atom d with a loss of
energy and radioactivity. The fact that it is nor predictable is in accord with a
theory that renounces cause relation. The radioactive decay argument is effec-
tive in a determinism which needs perfect cause relation but a position which
renounces the cause relation doesn’t have any problem. Obviously this theory
keeps needing to give up free will. ii) otherwise we could cause relation between
parts of the universe as a primitive, only observable, and sometimes completely
unintelligible, as in the case of isotopes. This wouldn’t have the burden of guar-
anteeing continuitybetweenamultiplicity of entities sincewewouldn’t haveany
multiplicity. It would only need to account for the romantic idea of free will and
it would be a relation like the others, with which we select. So, if we desire, we
could avoid determinism while keeping the advantages of monism. Personally,
I prefer case i) for its greater clarity, because it doesn’t leave uncertainty cases in
which it’s not clear how to apply cause relation and for the fact that it’s soberer
because it avoids to introduce where I think it’s not needed.
One may think that this solution is ad hoc. It’s true only in a really general
notion of ad hoc solution. In fact, not only it solve the problems I’ve been talking
about but also counterexamples by quantum physics to the identity principle
of indescernibles and it might work with both relativity and quantum physics.
Moreover, it will solve other philosophical questions like the ship of Theseus, the
personal identity and the question if the statue of Kant or the piece of marble
(or bronze) exists. This theory wouldn’t ask positive sciences to work differently.
Even if it redefines notions which are fundamental for positive sciences, like the
notion of motion and entity, the monist position is completely consistent with
positive sciences. In the end, and to my advice mostly, monism solves every
difficulty with cause relation by negating this relation in the first place.
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